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When asked to perform a certain task, we typically spend a decent amount of time
thinking thoughts unrelated to that task–a phenomenon referred to as “mind-wandering.”
It is thought that this mind-wandering is driven at least in part by our unfinished goals
and concerns. Previous studies have shown that just after presenting a participant
with their own concerns, their reports of task-unrelated thinking increased somewhat.
However, effects of these concerns on task performance were somewhat inconsistent.
In this study we take the opposite approach, and examine whether task performance
depends on the self-reported thought content. Specifically, a particularly intriguing aspect
of mind-wandering that has hitherto received little attention is the difficulty of disengaging
from it, in other words, the “stickiness” of the thoughts. While presenting participants
with their own concerns was not associated with clear effects on task performance, we
showed that the reports of off-task thinking and variability of response times increased
with the amount of self-reported stickiness of thoughts. This suggests that the stickiness
of mind-wandering is a relevant variable, and participants are able to meaningfully report
on it.
Keywords: mind-wandering, current concerns, distraction, SART, sustained attention, goals
INTRODUCTION
Whilemost of experimental psychology is based on the idea ofmanipulating behavior with different
task conditions, a small body of research looks at what happens when participants do not perform
the task but instead become distracted (Antrobus et al., 1970; Klinger, 1990; Smallwood and
Schooler, 2014). In that literature, distraction is usually defined as task-unrelated thinking, a variant
of mind-wandering. Because by definition task-unrelated thinking is not a task, it is measured
indirectly with a variety of methods including response time variability (which is increased when
task performance is contaminated with task-unrelated processes; Bastian and Sackur, 2013), event-
related potentials (which are typically reduced relative to task-related stimuli when someone is
mind-wandering; Smallwood et al., 2008; Kam et al., 2011; Macdonald et al., 2011) and pupil size
(which responds less to presented stimuli when someone is mind-wandering; Smallwood et al.,
2011; Mittner et al., 2014). However, the most frequently used method to examine task-unrelated
thinking involves “thought probes,” in which the task is intermixed with questions such as “were
you just now on-task, or thinking about something else?” (Smallwood et al., 2004). Based on these
responses, task performance can be compared between the periods just prior to reports of being
off-task and periods just prior to reports of being on-task. Usually, off-task reports are associated
with worse task performance in terms of response time or accuracy (McVay and Kane, 2009), and
especially response time variability (Bastian and Sackur, 2013).
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There are many different theories about what triggers
task-unrelated thinking (see Smallwood and Schooler,
2014 for a review). These theories range from a failure of
executive control (McVay and Kane, 2010) to decoupling
from the environment such that external stimuli become less
important (Smallwood et al., 2011) to preoccupation with
current concerns (Klinger, 1966, 1977, 2013). Each of these
theories has been developed in the context of a specific (set
of) tasks. It is likely that not one theory of mind-wandering is
correct, but that different task situations lead to the prevalence of
mind-wandering triggered by different factors.
The “current concerns” theory of mind-wandering—which
states that goals or problems that currently occupy a person
tend to intrude on thinking processes—has received less
attention in recent times. One reason for this may be that it
is difficult to manipulate and control current concerns in a
task. Nevertheless, McVay and Kane (2013) developed a task
that could manipulate concerns, and demonstrated that task-
unrelated thinking increased when participants were presented
with stimuli priming their on-going goals and concerns. Just
after presenting such concerns, participants showed an increased
tendency to report being off-task relative to non-self-related
goals. This effect occurred despite the fact that participants were
completely unaware of the fact that any concerns were inserted
in the task, suggesting that concern-related thinking is largely
automatic. Concerns were also associated with a slight decrease in
task accuracy. While McVay and Kane’s task was a variant of the
sustained attention to response task (Robertson et al., 1997), it has
also been shown that reminding participants of unfulfilled goals
increased intrusive thoughts during a reading task (Masicampo
and Baumeister, 2011).
It is unclear why the behavioral effects of reminding people
of their concerns is relatively weak and inconsistent if concerns
are such an important driving factor of mind-wandering. One
potential explanation is that the amount and type of mind-
wandering triggered by concerns is not precisely time-locked to
the presentation of the concerns (but the data analyses are). If
that is the case, declines in task performance may only occur at
the moment that the concern becomes so engrossing that task
priorities are more or less forgotten, and this could occur at
a random moment after concerns have been presented. It has
been suggested that mind-wandering related to unattained goals
is particularly rigid, inflexible, and narrowly-focused (Marchetti
et al., 2016). Joormann et al. (2011) introduced the idea of
“sticky” modes of thinking in which people “have difficulty
keeping irrelevant negative material from entering working
memory” and manipulating it. Sticky modes of thinking consist
of trains of thought that are difficult to disengage from (van
Vugt et al., 2012). This tendency is also associated with a habit
of rumination, i.e., recurrent, uncontrolled and habitual negative
thought (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). While rumination is
restricted to clinical samples, Verplanken et al. (2007) developed
a questionnaire to assess the tendency to engage in habitual
negative thinking that is applicable to more general populations.
This questionnaire uses a participant’s own metacognitive insight
to measure the degree to which negative self-related thinking
occurs frequently, is initiated without awareness and is difficult
to control. Verplanken and colleagues observed that scoring high
on this questionnaire was associated with lower self-esteem, an
increase in the speed of processing of negative self-related stimuli,
and increased symptoms of anxiety and depression. In addition,
the score on this questionnaire was associated with implicit
and explicit measures of body dissatisfaction (Verplanken and
Tangelder, 2011), which is another manifestation of a concern
people may have.
Together, these studies suggest that there is a “sticky”
dimension of off-task thinking, which reflects its tendency to
be repetitive, uncontrolled, habitual, and difficult to disengage
from. The material that tends to give rise to uncontrolled and
habitual thinking is often a concern or goal that is unfinished.
These goals can range from positively-valenced planning for
the future to negatively-valenced worry about whether one can
even solve these concerns. Worries related to the self could also
fall in this category, because negative self-related thinking often
revolves around the abstract goals of being “good enough” and
performing well. With this definition of sticky thinking, it may
well be the case that in the current concerns task, such sticky
thinking is primed. Such thinking can increase and decrease
in strength over the course of the experiment, and may occur
largely under the conscious surface (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren,
2006). The moment a participant latches onto such cues, a sticky
thought process may be set in motion. However, this may not
always occur reliably time-locked to the appearance of words that
reflect these concerns. If this is the case, that could explain why
in a current concerns mind-wandering task, there can be little
difference in task performance between the concern conditions,
as McVay and Kane observed. It also suggests that when relying
on participant’s introspection ormeta-cognitive insight instead of
the task conditions to find out when sticky thinking occurs, this
could in fact reveal decreases in task performance. Specifically,
such momentary increases in stickiness should be associated in
particular with increases in response time variability and off-task
thinking.
Another dimension of off-task thinking that has been
distinguished is its temporal focus. Stawarczyk et al. (2011)
demonstrated that after asking participants to write about
their current goals, participants exhibited more future-related
thoughts in a sustained-attention to response task. Ruby
et al. (2013) demonstrated that thoughts that were past-related
predicted future negative mood, while thoughts that were future-
related predicted future positive mood on a simple choice
response task. Plimpton et al. (2015) found in a vigilance task that
dysphoric participants reported less thinking about the future,
and more about the past when presented with thought probes.
In addition, positive words presented on the screen triggered
more future-related thoughts relative to negative words. While
in general future-related thinking is posited to be adaptive and
more prevalent than past-related thinking, other studies have
shown that when given the option, participants report mostly
an atemporal focus (Jackson et al., 2013). Yet, none of these
studies directly assessed the effect of temporal focus on task
performance. We therefore decided to explore the temporal
dimension of task-unrelated thinking in addition to its stickiness
dimension.
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To examine the sticky and temporal dimensions of off-
task thinking and its effect on behavior, we used the current
concerns paradigm introduced by McVay and Kane (2013). This
paradigm consisted of a pre-experiment questionnaire to collect
a participant’s concerns, and an actual SART task in which these
concerns were embedded. Critically, we added thought probe
questions to assess the degree of stickiness and temporal focus
to test whether it is the task condition that leads to declines in
performance, or rather the mode of the thinking.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The 26 participants (12 female, age mean: 21.7 , range: 19–
29) were Dutch native speakers from the city of Groningen
community and were compensated with a monetary reward of
e17 for their participation. The experimental procedures were in
agreement with the Declaration of Helsinki and all participants
signed an Informed Consent form. Participants were excluded
if their go-trial errors exceeded 50% of all trials, suggesting
random guessing. None of the participants exhibited such an
error rate. One participant was excluded from further analysis
because she/he aborted the experiment half-way.
Materials
Questionnaire Session
Participants were requested to fill out three questionnaires
online prior to the experiment. The first two of these
questionnaires served as fillers to distract from the purpose
of the experiment. Participants filled in the Cognitive Failures
Questionnaire (McVay and Kane, 2009, 2013), the Habit Index
of Negative Thinking (Verplanken et al., 2007) and the Personal
Concerns Inventory (PCI; adapted from Cox and Klinger, 2004).
In the PCI, participants wrote a short statement expressing a
current concern/goal in their lives to each of nine categories: (1)
Home and Household Matters, (2) Employment and Finances,
(3) Partner, Family and Relatives, (4) Friends and Acquaintances,
(5) Spiritual Matters, (6) Self Changes, (7) Education and
Training, (8) Health and Medical Matters, (9) Hobbies, Pastimes
and Recreation. Items of the PCI that were judged to be
inappropriate for our research setting were dropped (e.g.,
Substance Use; Love, Sex and Intimacy). Participants rated the
importance of each concern on a Likert-Scale ranging from 1
(not at all important) to 10 (the most important concern/goal in
my life right now) and provided a temporal estimate when the
goal/concern would be accomplished/resolved. Participants were
encouraged to focus on concerns that were issues on the time
scale of at most 2 years.
Experimental Session
Materials were 360 English-to-Dutch translated words, drawn
quasi-randomly from the Battig-Montague word pool (Battig and
Montague, 1969). This word database consists of 56 categories,
split into verbal taxonomies covering geography (e.g., countries),
nature (e.g., flower), different animals (e.g., bird, fish) and a wide
range of other categories used in common language. Given that
the word pool originated from American culture, certain words
were translated to fit Dutch culture. For instance, “John” from
the category “names” was changed to the Dutch name “Daan” or
“South Dakota” from the category “States” was changed to the
Dutch province “Drenthe.”
Task
Two of the most significant concerns per participant were
extracted from the Personal Concern Inventory and translated
into three-word structures (e.g., find - new - job), with each
word serving as a stimulus in the SART (see Figure 1B) in three
consecutive trials. If two concerns were rated equally important,
the more imminent concern was selected. We also extracted two
control statements from participants from the pilot study that
were relatively idosyncratic. These control statements were used
for the subsequent participants as control statements.
We adopted the SART task from McVay and Kane (2013)
but implemented two changes: (1) We reduced the number of
trials by a third to reduce the time of the session from 90 to
60 min. In a pilot experiment, participants complained about
the duration and this complaint was mirrored in exceptionally
short response times in the last 30 min. (2) We implemented
more trials between the current concern triplets and the thought
probes. While McVay and Kane (2013) used one, three and five
trials, we increased this to either four or five, counterbalanced
across the experiment (see Figure 1B). We adapted this interval
because we were interested in response time variability after
the current concern triplets had been shown and needed a
representative amount of trials to be able to compute that
number. In eight blocks of 90 trials respectively, each block
contained two repetitions of the same 45 trials, in which one
current concern and one control concern triplet were included
(which were the only things that differed between the two
repetitions). The two current and control concerns alternated
across blocks and were counterbalanced across the experiment.
After each concern triplet, four/five trials preceded our set of
probe questions (see Figures 1B,C). Per block, one additional
control probe was randomly inserted, not following a specific
concern. This probe will be used as a non-concern control
condition. Each block of 90 trials therefore contained two current
concern and two other concern trial triplets and four associated
thought probes (consisting of three questions each), as well as two
control thought probes inserted at random points in the task. Of
the 90 trials in each block, 10 were no-go trials (approximately
11% of the trials).
Procedure
Participants completed the questionnaires in an online survey
(see section “Materials”), a week before the experimental session.
In the experimental session, we adopted the perceptual version
of the SART from McVay and Kane (2009, 2013). Participants
completed a prolonged go/no-go task and were instructed to
press the space bar as quickly as possible when they see a word
in lower case (e.g., “lily”) and to withhold a response when a
word is printed in upper case (e.g., “BANANA”). The words were
presented and masked for 0.3 s each and participants had 3.6 s in
total to respond (Figure 1A). Time between trials was randomly
picked from a uniform distribution ranging from 1.5 to 2.1 s.
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Temporal structure of an individual trial. (B) Trial structure. In this example there are four trials in-between the current concern trials and the thought
probes. (C) Thought probe questions. The first question asks about the content, the second asks about the stickiness of the content, the third asks about the
temporal orientation of that content (stimuli were translated from Dutch to English for display purposes).
Four or five trials after the concern structures, participants were
shown “thought probes”—questions probing their subjective
experience. Specifically, the three questions interrogated the
content, stickiness level and temporal orientation of the thoughts
just preceding the probe (see Figure 1C). The first question
replicated McVay and Kane (2013), and pertains to the nature
of the participant’s thoughts just preceding the question, asking
whether they thought about (1) the task, (2) task performance,
(3) everyday life, (4) current state of being, (5) personal concerns,
(6) day dreams, (7) other. We subsequently classified responses
larger than 2 as “off-task” and responses 1 and 2 as “on-task.”
The results do not change qualitatively when taking only 1 as
an index of on-task. The other two questions had not been
used in previous research on the current concerns task. The
second question was derived from the Habit Index of Negative
Thinking (Verplanken et al., 2007), and asked about how difficult
it was to disengage from the previous thought and participants
indicated on a Likert-Scale ranging from 1 (very difficult) to
5 (very easy) the stickiness level of the thought. The coding
of this Likert scale was reversed for the analyses for ease of
interpretation. The third question was similar to one used in
previous mind-wandering experiments (Smallwood et al., 2011;
Ruby et al., 2013), asking about the temporal orientation of
the thought, i.e., whether it was related to (1) the past, (2) the
present or (3) the future. After four blocks, participants were
given the opportunity to take a break. The experiment ended with
a debriefing, in which the participant was first asked whether they
noticed anything special about the words, and then was explained
the actual purpose of the experiment. None of our participants
indicated noticing their concerns were embedded in the stimulus
stream.
Apparatus
The questionnaire was created, distributed and controlled with
Google Forms. Stimuli were presented and the registration of
responses was controlled with PsychoPy 1.83 (Peirce, 2007). The
experiment ran on a Mac Mini with a 2.4 GHz Intel Core 2
Duo processor and a 21-inch LCD monitor, with a 1920 × 1080
resolution and a 60 Hz refresh rate.
Data analysis
We computed the average response time, accuracy, and
coefficient of variance of response time on the 8 trials preceding
each thought probe. We compared these values between the
different task conditions and different levels of responses on the
thought probes by means of linear mixed effects models (Bates
et al., 2015). Linear mixed effects models were used because
they are robust to missing or unbalanced data. The effect of
an experimental factor was tested by comparing the models
with and without that factor by means of a chi-squared test.
When the model fits improved significantly according to the
chi-square statistic, the factor was judged significant. When
the factor was significant, the reliability of individual contrasts
was determined by means of a post-hoc t-test on the relevant
regression coefficients (using the R package lsmeans).
RESULTS
We first checked how inserting current concerns in the stimulus
stream affected task performance and off-task thinking. We
found that accuracy was higher in the non-concern control
condition than in either of the two concern conditions
[Figure 2A, χ2
(2)
= 452.7, p < 0.001]. Just like McVay and
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FIGURE 2 | The effect of current concern condition on (A) accuracy, (B) response time, and (C) the coefficient of variation (CV) of response time. Error
bars reflect standard errors.
FIGURE 3 | Frequency of off-task thinking by current concern
condition. Number of off-task thinking reports is increased in the current
concerns condition relative to the control condition. Error bars reflect standard
errors.
Kane did not observe a consistent difference in accuracy between
control concerns and personal concerns, we did not either [post-
hoc t(475) = −0.8, n.s.]. They did not have the non-concern
control condition, for which we observed a clear increase in
accuracy.
Unlike McVay and Kane, we also report on response times.
Response times were shorter in the concern conditions relative
to the control condition [Figure 2B, χ2
(2)
= 9.0, p < 0.05]. The
coefficient of variation of response time (RTCV) has previously
been thought to reflect mind-wandering. We observed that
in contrast to our expectation of more mind-wandering after
priming the participant with concerns, the coefficient of variation
of response time (RTCV) showed a trend toward being larger
in the control condition relative to the two concern conditions
[Figure 2C, χ2
(2)
= 5.3, p = 0.07].
If current concerns increase the amount of off-task thinking,
then off-task thinking should be increased just after current
concern stimuli, and this should be—as McVay and Kane
observed–larger for own concerns relative to other concerns.
Figure 3 shows that the reported frequency of off-task thinking
differed between the conditions [χ2
(2)
= 12.5, p < 0.01).
Specifically, off-task thinking was more frequent in the current
concern condition than in the non-concern control condition
FIGURE 4 | Fraction of off-task thinking as a function of the temporal
orientation of these thoughts. Error bars reflect standard errors.
[t(46) = 3.6, p < 0.001], but it did not differ between the
participant’s own and other’s concerns [t(46) = 1.1, n.s.].
Since the effects of the concern conditions on behavior
were relatively moderate, we then investigated whether temporal
orientation was related to the frequency of off-task thinking.
Indeed, we observed that the frequency of off-task thinking




= 34.3, p < 0.001]. Specifically, the “present” responses
were associated with significantly less frequent off-task thinking
than the “past” responses [t(46.7) = 4.8, p < 0.001] and “future"
responses [t(46.7) = 6.3 , p < 0.001].
We have hypothesized that the sticky nature of the content
of thinking is what makes task performance decline. To test
this hypothesis, we asked whether participants reported
more frequent off-task thinking when they responded
that it was difficult to disengage from the thought (our
operationalization of “sticky thinking”). We found that
the frequency of off-task thinking decreased as the




Finally, we asked whether this self-reported stickiness was
also associated with response time variability. It has been
suggested the variability in response time is a sensitive measure
of mind-wandering (Bastian and Sackur, 2013). Indeed, Figure 5
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FIGURE 5 | Off-task thinking (right) and variability in response time (left) increases with self-reported thought stickiness. Error bars reflect standard errors.
shows that as stickiness increased, the coefficient of variation of
response time increased [χ2
(1)
= 4.1, p < 0.05].
DISCUSSION
We showed–just like McVay and Kane (2013)–that current
concerns had only small effects on task performance. However,
when examining the data from the perspective of the contents of
their thought processes, we found clear effects on the probability
of off-task thinking and variability in response times. Specifically,
in line with ideas from the field of clinical psychology, the more
difficult it is to disengage from the thinking, the more likely the
person is off-task, and the more variable their response times.
We also showed that future and past thoughts were more often
off-task than present-related thoughts.
Together, this suggests that current concerns do not reliably
induce off-task thinking, but when off-task thinking does occur
it seems to affect task performance. To consider why inserting
concerns does not reliably affect task performance (at least
not time-locked to the concern probes) it is instructive to
discuss current theories about how concerns could affect task
performance. Hiatt and Trafton (2015) created a computational
cognitive model of the current concerns task based on the idea
that mind-wandering kicks off when there is a natural break in
the task. Such a break occurs when one is not actively reasoning
toward a particular goal, and at the same time there is an
active thought in working memory that can set off a train of
mind-wandering. In their model, the increase in response time
variability would be explained by an increase in the frequency
of thoughts “popping” into working memory, which disrupts
performance of the main task. Their model does not consider a
dimension of thought stickiness because the model simply halts
when it is distracted.
To be able to explain the effect of thought stickiness, the
mind-wandering process itself needs to be explicitly modeled as
a sequence of episodic retrievals, as we have done in another
computational model (van Vugt et al., 2015). In that model,
increased stickiness could be modeled as an increased mental
distance between the sticky thought and thoughts related to
task goals in episodic memory. This increased distance makes
it difficult to return to the task, which relies on retrieving the
task goal. In contrast, continuing to mind-wander is fairly easy.
Although the appearance of a concern word may increase the
probability of it being retrieved, thereby leading one further away
from task goals, this mind-wandering does not need to be exactly
time-locked to the appearance of these concerns. Indeed, off-task
thinking was associated with a significantly lower task accuracy
than on-task thinking [χ2
(1)
= 6.2, p < 0.05], although it did
not affect RT and its variability. In addition, it may well be the
case that only concerns that are associated with worries of the
participant lead to task disruption. Since concerns defined in our
study could both be goals that have a relatively positive affective
value and concerns that are associated with worry, this mixture
of concern types may also explain the inconsistent effects.
One puzzling finding in our study of the current concerns task
was that there appeared to be a change in speed-accuracy trade-
off across conditions, such that current concerns were associated
with a decrease in accuracy, but also a decrease in response time
and its variability. Such changes in speed-accuracy have also been
reported in previous studies using the SART. For example, Seli
et al. (2012) demonstrated that when participants were explicitly
cautioned to respond slowly, then accuracy increased together
with response time. Nevertheless, the conditions in our case did
not differ in any way in terms of instructions, and therefore
a strategic adjustment of speed-accuracy trade-off is unlikely.
We can speculate that presenting concerns (whether it be the
participant’s own or other’s) diverts their attention a little bit
from the task, and thereby leads them to perform the task
more on auto-pilot, with lower accuracy and faster response
times.
We have observed that self-reported thought “stickiness”
has substantial effects on task performance in a laboratory
study. Since task-unrelated thinking occupies between 10 and
50% of our daily thinking time (Antrobus et al., 1970;
Smallwood et al., 2007; Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010), and
since maladaptive forms of task-unrelated thinking such as
rumination have destructive consequences on productivity and
well-being, studying when, how, and why this occurs is crucial.
A previous experience sampling study of mind-wandering
showed that when people reported their mind-wandering
involved episodic memories, those were predominantly personal
concerns (Song and Wang, 2012). Given our finding that
self-reported stickiness affects performance in a very simple
decision task, it would be interesting to include our stickiness
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question in experience sampling studies, and assess how it
affects well-being in the real world. This question may be of
particular interest when using experience sampling to chart the
“thought trajectories” of depressed patients (van der Krieke et al.,
2015).
While increases in self-reported stickiness may be related
to tendencies for depression, it may also be interesting and
relevant to examine the correlates and consequences of lower
self-reported stickiness. For example, it has been shown that
scores on the HINT, from which we took the question on mental
stickiness, are negatively related to scores on a mindfulness
questionnaire (Verplanken et al., 2007). Moreover, participants
who scored high on the HINT showed a larger reduction in
distress over disturbing pictures as a result of a mindfulness
induction relative to participants who scored low on the
HINT (Verplanken and Fisher, 2014). Mindfulness may help
make people aware of their unconscious thought habits, and
reduce the strength of those habits by consciously disengaging
from these habits (Williams, 2010; Vago and Silbersweig, 2012).
In particular, it has been suggested that mindfulness also
reduces the tendency to get “stuck” in patterns of negative
thinking (van Vugt et al., 2012). On the positive side, it is
thought to cultivate a sense of “non-attachment” to worries and
concerns (Sahdra et al., 2011), and equanimity to whatever occurs
in experience (Desbordes et al., 2014). It would therefore be
interesting to measure meditators’ scores on mind-wandering
tasks that include questions about the stickiness of their thinking.
In short, we have demonstrated that mind-wandering can vary
in the amount of self-reported stickiness, and that this stickiness
has consequences for task performance. As mental stickiness
increases, the variance in response time does too. Given the close
relatedness of mental stickiness to psychopathology, we think this
thought probe question is an important tool in future studies of
mind-wandering.
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